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This paper provides a unified treatment of externalities associated with fertility and human 
capital accumulation as they relate to pension systems. It considers as overlapping generations 
model in which every generation consists of high earners and low earners with the proportion 
of types being determined endogenously. The number of children is deterministically chosen 
but the children’s future ability is in part stochastic, in part determined by the family 
background, and in part through education. In addition to the customary externality source 
associated with a change in average fertility rate, this setup highlights another externality 
source. This is due to the effect of a parent’s choice of number and educational attainment of 
his children on the proportion of high-ability individuals in the steady state. Our results 
include: (i) Investments in education of high- and low-ability parents must be subsidized, (ii) 
direct child subsidies to one or both parent types can be negative; i.e., they can be taxes, (iii) 
net subsidies to children (direct child subsidies plus education subsidies) to high-ability 
parents are always positive, and to low-ability parents can be positive or negative, (iv) either 
education subsidies or child subsidies, when used alone, can dominate the other instrument, 
(v) using child subsidy instruments alone entails a higher fertility rate and a lower ratio of 
high- to low-ability children, as compared to using education subsidies alone. 
JEL Code: H55, J13. 
Keywords: pay-as-you-go social security, endogenous fertility, education, endogenous ratio of 
high to low ability types, three externality sources, education subsidies, child subsidies. 
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One of the most pressing problems facing the economies of the industrialized world is
the ﬁscal solvency of their pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) social security systems.1 An im-
portant contributing factor to this problem has been the recent drastic fertility declines
in Western Europe and Japan. What truly determines fertility, and what accounts for
the observed evolution in fertility behavior, are still open questions. What is clear,
however, is that, faced with a PAYGO social security system, parents do not have the
right incentives to choose a fertility rate that is optimal. In such systems, each person’s
fertility decision aﬀects the economy’s population growth rate and with it everybody’s
pension beneﬁts. Speciﬁcally, an increase in the rate of population growth increases the
number of future workers who will have to support a retired person. No individual,
however, takes this impact into account and that leads to a decentralized equilibrium
outcome with too few children.2
The above problem is exacerbated by another externality associated with the “qual-
ity” of children, and their human capital accumulation, through the education decisions
of parents. The rate of return of a pay-as-you-go system depends not just on the fertility
rate, but also on productivity growth. The more productive the children, the higher
will be their ability to produce and to pay taxes. This reinforces the public good nature
of a family’s child-rearing activities.3
Most of the literature has thus far treated the quality and quantity issues separately;
or else have lumped the investments in quantity and quality together as if one decision
1This has led to reforms in a number of countries. See Penner (2007) who surveys the recent reforms
i nC a n a d a ,G e r m a n y ,I t a l y ,J a p a n ,S w e d e n ,a n dt h eU K .
2In addition to this “intergenerational transfer” eﬀect, the literature has also noted an oﬀsetting
force called “capital dilution” eﬀect: A higher fertility rate, given the aggregate capital saved by the
previous generation, implies a lower capital to labor ratio reducing per capita output; see Michel and
Pestieau (1993) and Cigno (1993).
3To internalize the quantity and quality eﬀects, some economists have advocated a policy of linking
pension beneﬁts (or contributions) to individuals’ fertility choices. See, among others, Abio et al.
(2004), Bental (1989), Cigno et al. (2003), Fenge and Meier (2004), Kolmar (1997), van Groezen et al.
(2000, 2003).
1determines both.4 A basic shortcoming of this approach is that it cannot distinguish
between child subsidies, which correct externalities emanating from fertility decisions,
and education subsidies which correct for externalities due to investing in education.
This lack of distinction becomes more of a serious problem when the two types of
externalities interact as they often do.
To be sure, there are a number of studies in the literature that distinguish between
quantity and quality decisions and study them both in one uniﬁed framework. Peters
(1995) is an early example of this. In his model, both fertility and education choices are
made deterministically. The main shortcomings of his approach are the deterministic
nature of both quantity and quality decisions, and the lack of any heterogeneity among
parents. Cigno et al. (2003) also allow for both fertility and quality. Fertility is fully
deterministic, but children’s quality, which Cigno et al. deﬁne in terms of “lifetime tax
contributions”, is in part random and in part determined through actions of parents.
The limitations of their study come from the static nature of their model, in looking at
the decisions of the initial parent only, and their not allowing for heterogeneity among
parents.
Cigno and Luporini (2003), while building on Cigno et al. (2003), allow for parents’
heterogeneity in terms of their ability to inﬂuence their children’s probability of success
in life.5 However, their model remains static in nature as they too do not go beyond
the decisions of the initial parents. In Meier and Wrede (2008) both fertility and types
are partly stochastic and partly determined by investments. The limitation of their
model comes from their ignoring the impact of fertility and education investments on
the distribution of types in the economy. But this induced change in the distribution of
types constitutes an important component of fertility and education externalities.6
4Cremer et al. (2003, 2008) are examples of this latter approach, while Cremer et al. (2006) is
concerned only with quantity decisions.
5They also drop Cigno et al.’s (2003) assumption that fertility is fully deterministic.
6Sinn (2004) also considers a model that allows or both fertility and quality. In his setup fertility
is fully random and quality fully deterministic. However, Sinn is interested more in examining the
2The current paper addresses the quantity and quality questions in an overlapping
generations model with high- and low-ability individuals. The unique feature of our
study is its endogenous determination of the distribution of types. Speciﬁcally, we allow
for this distribution to be aﬀected by both education and fertility decisions. This frame-
work gives rise to three sources of externality. First, there is the customary externality
associated with the change in average fertility–the intergenerational transfer eﬀect. It
arises from the fertility decisions of parents. This source of externality disappears if the
pension system is a pre-funded one. The second source of externality emanates from
decisions that change the distribution of types even if average fertility is kept constant.
It arises from both education decisions and fertility decisions. Its unique feature is that
it does not depend on the institution of social security and exists for pre-funded systems
as well. The third source of externality is due to interaction between average fertility
and the distribution of types. It too arises from both education decisions and fertility
decisions. It is diﬀerent from the second externality source in that it exists because of
the PAYGO institution and disappears if one moves to a pre-funded system. It is also
diﬀerent from the ﬁrst externality source because it will not exist if the distribution of
types were immutable.
One distinguishing element between quantity and quality decisions is that of timing.
One decides on the number of children quite early; the quality of children, i.e. their future
earning capacity, is determined much later. We incorporate this timing sequence in our
two-period overlapping generations model by assuming a sequential decision making
process: At the end of the ﬁrst-period, the young decide on starting a family and
having children ﬁrst and then on the extent of their children’s education.
We assume that parents choose the number of their children deterministically. It is
true that the actual number of children in a family does not necessarily coincide with
the number that parents initially intended to have.7 However, this choice is intrinsically
properties of a traditional PAYGO system rather than the design of an optimal pension plan.
7Infertility, premature death, misplanning and multiple births are some of the reasons explaining
3more deterministic and less susceptible to random and other shocks than determining
the quality of one’s children. As to the quality, it is unrealistic to expect that one can
determine the future earning abilities of one’s children in a deterministic fashion simply
by investing in their education and training. We assume that quality is determined
by three factors. One is random; the second is due to education; and the third is
pre-determined by one’s “genes” and family background. Nevertheless all children of a
particular parent turn out to be either of high- or of low-ability.
Finally, we study the design of pension systems within the Samuelson’s (1958) over-
lapping generations framework as opposed to Diamond’s (1965). We thus assume that
transfer of resources to the future can occur only through a storage technology with a
ﬁxed rate of return. This approach makes the choice of PAYGO or storage to be opti-
mally mutually exclusive: One uses one mechanism or the other depending on whether
the average fertility rate8 or the interest rate is higher. This dichotomy yields a stark




Consider, within an overlapping generations framework, the sequence of decisions a child
has to face after he is born. First, upon reaching adulthood, he has to decide on starting
a family and having children. Subsequently, as a parent, he has to decide on the extent
of his children’s education. Finally, the retirement period arrives. Such a rich model
allows for children, adults, parents, and the retired (grand parents) to overlap, requiring
a four-period overlapping generations model. Figure 1 depicts this sequence. However,
analyzing a full-ﬂedged four period model quickly becomes cumbersome and too detailed
this gap.
8What Samuelson (1958) called the “biological” rate of interest.
4Old (t) Parent (t-1) Adult (t-2) Child (t-3)
No decision Educating One’s 
Children
Having Children No decision
Figure 1:
for developing insights. We thus take a short cut and transform the four-period setup
we have in mind into a simple two-period overlapping generations model. To do this
we assume the decisions of having children and educating them occur sequentially just
prior to the beginning of one’s retirement; see Figure 2. This saves us from having to
distinguish between working as an adult and working as a parent.
Assume each generation consists of two types of people; they posses either a high
or a low earning ability. Denote high- and low-ability types by subscripts h and l and
let j = h,l. All children of a particular parent will turn out to be either of high- or of
low-ability; no mix of high- and low-ability children is possible. There are three factors
that determine if a child turns into a high- or a low-ability individual. One is due
education; the second is a random element; and the third is pre-determined by one’s
“genes” and family background. The eﬀect of education on ability is, ceteris paribus,
most certainly positive. To introduce randomness into this process, we assume that
investing in education does not necessarily transform a child into a high-ability type;
instead, it only increases the probability of its occurrence. Thus, when a j-type parent
invests e “units” in educating his child, the child will have a πj = πj(e) probability of
turning out to be of high-ability. Naturally, the probability that the child will be of
5Retire Have children; educate them and work
Old Young
Figure 2:
low-ability is 1−πj. We assume that πj(·) is an increasing and strictly concave function
with πj (0) > 0.
The third factor, the child’s family background, manifests itself through the func-
tional form of πj(e) and that is why the function is indexed by j. Speciﬁcally, one would
expect that πh(e) >π l(e). That is, for the same level of (formal) education, children
of high-ability parents have a higher chance of becoming more able. This reﬂects the
fact that high-ability parents tend to spend more time reading to their children and
engage them in activities that builds up their human capital. To say more about the
structure of πj(e), one needs to know the precise nature of the interaction between (for-
mal) education and family background on a child’s ability. Decompose πj(e) into two
distinct elements: an educational component π(e) and a family background component
represented by a parameter θj,w i t hθl <θ h. One can make either of the following as-
sumptions about the interaction between π(e) and θj. In one, the relationship is additive
so that πj = π(e)+θj.9 According to this formulation, the marginal productivity of
spending e dollars on educating one’s children is the same regardless of the parent’s type.
9Observe that in this case θl <θ h 6 1 − π (e).
6In the other, the relationship between π(e) and θj is multiplicative with πj = θjπ(e).10
This alternative assumption states that the marginal productivity of spending e dollars
is higher for the more able parents. We will point out below when the implications of
the two assumptions diﬀer for the results.
Assume generation T consists of NT people. Denote the proportion of high-ability
persons in generation T by δT (0 <δ T < 1) so that the number of high-ability persons
in generation T is δTNT. Parents choose the number of the children they want to have
and do so deterministically. Denote the number of children each j-type parent will
have by nj. Thus δTNT high-ability parents of generation T e n du pw i t h(δTNT)nhπh
high-ability children and (δTNT)nh (1 − πh) low-ability children. Similarly, (1 − δT)NT
low-ability persons of generation T end up with (1 − δT)NTnlπl high-ability children
and (1 − δT)NTnl (1 − πl) low-ability children. Consequently, the proportion of high-
ability children in the next generation will be
δT+1 =
δTNTnhπh +( 1− δT)NTnlπl
δTNTnh +( 1− δT)NTnl
=
δTnhπh +( 1− δT)nlπl
δTnh +( 1− δT)nl
. (1)
2.2 Steady state
In the steady state, δT+1 = δT ≡ δ. It then follows from equation (1) relating δT+1 to
δT that
δnhπh +( 1− δ)nlπl
δnh +( 1− δ)nl
= δ. (2)
Observe that δ is a weighted average of πh and πl and thus bracketed by them. Moreover,









Let ej denote the j-type’s investment in the education of his children. Solve equation
10In this case, θl <θ h 6 1/π(e).
7(2) for δ a n dw r i t et h es o l u t i o na sδ = δ(eh,e l,n h,n l). Introduce
Z ≡ 2δ(nh − nl)+nl(1 + πl) − nhπh. (4)
























(1 − δ)(πl − δ)
Z
. (8)
We prove in Appendix A proves that a necessary condition for the stability of steady-
state solution for δ, namely |∂δT+1/∂δT| < 1, is that Z>0.T h u s ,a s s u m i n gas t a b l e














Individuals have preferences over consumption when young, c, consumption when re-
tired, d, and the number of children, n. Preferences are represented by
U = u(c)+v(d)+ϕ(n). (9)
Assume each j-type person earns an income equal to βjI when young, where βh >β l.
Without any loss of generality, set βl =1and βh = β>1. Denote the non-education
cost of raising a child by a and the “quantity” of education provided to a child by e.
Choose the units of measurement for c,d, and e such that their producer prices are one.
The young individual spends a portion of his income on his immediate consumption,
c, a portion on raising his children, an, and another portion on educating his children,
8en. He saves the rest of his income in a storage technology with a rate of return equal
to r. Upon retirement, the individual receives and spends all his savings plus interest,
l e a v i n gn ob e q u e s t s .
The budget constraint for the j-type is given by
βjI = cj +
dj
1+r
+ ejnj + anj. (10)
The j-type young individual chooses cj,d j,n j, and ej to maximizes his utility (9) sub-
ject to his budget constraint (10). One can easily see that the solution for education
expenditures requires e =0 . This is not surprising given that education is costly to
the parent but bestows no utility upon him.11 Setting e =0and manipulating the
ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to cj,d j, and nj, the laissez faire solutions for these














Given strong separability and concavity of all subutility functions, c,d, and n are all
normal goods so that ch >c l,d h >d l, and nh >n l. This result is summarized as
Proposition 1 Consider an overlapping generations model in the steady state with two
types of people in each generation: high- and low-ability. Each type receives an income
commensurate with his ability when young and has preferences over consumption during
working years and retirement, as well as the number of children he will have. Each
type can have children of either ability. The probability of having a high-ability child
11This result is due to the assumption that parents love children of the same ability equally. If
parents prefer a high-ability child to a low-ability child, their utility will be aﬀected through educational
attainment of their children. Under this circumstance, e 6=0 . See Section 5.2 below.
9depends positively on investment in education and is higher, ceteris paribus, for high-
ability parents. Then:
(i) Investment in education by either type of parents increases the proportion of
high-ability persons in the steady state, δ.
(ii) The increase in the number of children of either type of parents can increase as
well as decrease δ. If δ increases with the number of children of one type parents, it will
decrease with the number of children of the other type.
(iii) In laissez-faire, high-ability parents consume more during working years and
retirement, and have a higher number of children (as compared to low-ability parents).
Neither types invests in education.
3 Utilitarian First Best
3.1 The problem and its solution
Denote the savings of an individual of type j by Sj = 0 a n dt h ep o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hr a t e
by
n ≡ δnh +( 1− δ)nl. (14)
The economy’s resource constraint is then written as
[δβ +( 1− δ)]I +















+ nl (a + el)+Sl
¤
. (15)
Given a ﬁxed rate of return on savings, the consumption of the retired should be ﬁnanced
either through private savings or from taxes imposed on the young as in a pay-as-you-go
retirement system. The mechanism with a higher rate of return, r or n, Samuelson’s
(1958) biological rate of return, should be used exclusively. This property makes it
simpler to solve the social planner’s problem in a sequential manner. First, one ﬁnds
the optimum conditional on the use of storage and PAYGO; then one compares the
10associated welfare levels of the two conditional optima. We study the more interesting
case of PAYGO in the text and discuss the storage technology in Appendix B.
In the absence of private savings, the economy’s resource constraint (15) simpliﬁes
to
[1 + (β − 1)δ)]I = δ
∙












The government’s optimization problem is then summarized by the Lagrangian
£ = δ [u(ch)+v(dh)+ϕ(nh)] + (1 − δ)[u(cl)+v(dl)+ϕ(nl)]
+μ
(
[1 + (β − 1)δ]I − δ
∙











leading to the following ﬁrst-order conditions with respect ch,c l,d h and dl:
∂£
∂ch
= δ[u0(ch) − μ]=0 , (17)
∂£
∂cl













Manipulating these conditions yields
ch = cl = c, and dh = dl = d.





=[ ϕ(nh) − ϕ(nl)]
+u0(c)
½





11so that D shows the change in social welfare due to an increase in the proportion of high-
ability persons in the population.12 With ch = cl and dh = dl, the ﬁrst bracketed term
on the right-hand side of (21) shows the net change in utilities. The second bracketed
expression shows the net change in resources; i.e. the increase in the available resources
minus the extra resources required in consumption. Using the deﬁnition of D and the
previous ﬁndings that ch = cl = c, dh = dl = d, and μ = u0(c), one can write the














































Note that, with ∂δ/∂eh > 0 and ∂δ/∂el > 0, either one of conditions (22) or (23) implies
D>0.
Recall that investing in education imposes only a cost on the individual but no
beneﬁt. Indeed, considering that the individual treats δ as given, this cost will be
the only eﬀect on him as ej increases. This increase entails a cost measured by −nj.














for increasing el. (27)
This externality arises through the eﬀect of ej on δ. Moreover, given that ∂δ/∂ej > 0
and D>0, this is a positive externality.
12Being a proportion,this is matched by a reduction in the proportion of low-ability persons.
12The externality terms (26)—(27) coming through δ may be divided into two parts.
One is due to the direct change in δ as ej changes. When there is an increase in the
proportion of high-ability persons in the population, matched of course by a reduction
in the proportion of low-ability persons, social welfare changes by the diﬀerence in the
utilities of high- and low-ability types and the change in the net resources (income
minus consumption). This eﬀect does not work through fertility; it is present also in
the absence of PAYGO pension plans when all second-period consumptions are ﬁnanced
by private savings. The second part, on the other hand, works through changing average
fertility. Its existence depends on having a PAYGO pension plan in place.13 It arises
indirectly as the change in δ changes n as well. Remember that n depends on δ and δ
depends on ej (as well as nj). This change in n is also neglected in private calculations.
With n = nl + δ(nh − nl), this eﬀect depends on the diﬀerence between nh and nl.
The various terms in D/u0(c) represent these two direct and indirect externalities. The
latter is captured by the (nh − nl)d/n2 term that appears in the deﬁnition of D/u0(c),
and the former by the remaining expressions therein.
Similarly, increasing nj has externalities of its own. When a j-type individual in-
creases his fertility rate, he does not take the eﬀect of his decision on n into consideration.
He thus perceives the eﬀect of increasing nj in his net welfare to consist of an increase
in his utility, ϕ0(nj)/u0(c) when expressed in monetary units, minus an increase in his
expenditures on nj, measured by a. Comparing this with the expressions in equations


















for increasing nl. (29)
The externalities associated with nj, as depicted by expressions (28)—(29), consist
of two distinct elements. While the ﬁrst element has no counterpart in the externalities
13That only one of the two components of the externality through δ is active for pre-funded systems
is demonstrated in Appendix B.
13associated with ej, the second element is identical in nature to the externality coming
from ej. The term d/n2 represents the ﬁrst element and captures the eﬀect of increasing
nh or nl on n, and through it on the aggregate resources available for distribution
between the young and the old under PAYGO. Speciﬁcally, this externality tells us that
increasing fertility increases the number of future working people who support a retired
person. This is the familiar positive “intergenerational transfer” eﬀect that appears in
the literature on growth with endogenous fertility; see Cigno (1993) and Michel and
Pestieau (1993). The second externality source, represented by the second expressions
in (28)—(29), is due to the change in δ. It is the same type of externality discussed
previously in relation to the eﬀect of ej on δ. T h ec r u c i a lp o i n ti st h a tt h e s ee x t e r n a l i t i e s
emanate from a change in δ which can come about from a change in either nj or ej.
This is why each of the second expressions in (28)—(29) is identical to its counterpart
in (26)—(27) except that ∂δ/∂nh and ∂δ/∂nl have replaced ∂δ/∂eh and ∂δ/∂el. Finally,
o b s e r v et h a tw i t hD>0, this externality source is positive if ∂δ/nj > 0 and is negative
if ∂δ/nj > 0.R e c a l la l s ot h a t∂δ/nh and ∂δ/nl are of opposite signs; hence one ability
type exerts a positive externality, and the other a negative externality, on the society
through their fertility decisions when mediated through δ.
The results thus far are summarized as
Proposition 2 (i) Under the utilitarian ﬁrst-best solution with PAYGO, consumption
when working and consumption when retired are equalized across types.
(ii) Investing in education of children by either type of parents increases the pro-
portion of high-ability children in the economy and bestows a positive externality on
everybody else. This externality has two components, one of which exists only in the
presence of PAYGO pension plans.
(iii) A parent’s fertility choice imposes two kinds of externalities on everyone else.
One is the familiar positive externality known as “intergenerational transfer” eﬀect. The
other emanates from a change in the proportion of high-ability children. This externality
14too has two components, one of which exists only in the presence of PAYGO pension
plans.
3.3 Optimal characterizations of ej and nj
To characterize of the ﬁrst-best solutions for ej and nj, substitute the expressions for
∂δ/∂eh and ∂δ/∂el from (5)—(6) into equations (22)—(23), simplify, and subtract one












This makes perfect sense. At the optimum, the last dollar spent on education by either
type must have the same impact on each type’s probability of having a high-ability
child.
Turning to the relationship between nh and nl, substitute the expressions for ∂δ/∂nh
and ∂δ/∂nl from (7)—(8) into equations (24)—(25) and simplify. Then subtract one
equation from another to get
ϕ0(nh) − ϕ0(nl) − (eh − el)u0(c)+
D
Z
(πh − πl)=0 . (32)
To see the intuition for this result, consider a concomitant increase in nh and a reduction
in nl. On the one hand, this changes the utilities of the two types of parents by ϕ0(nh)−
ϕ0(nl). On the other hand, there will be an increase in resource cost to the economy
because educational expenditures increase by eh − el which is worth (eh − el)u0(c) in
terms of utilities. This should be subtracted from ϕ0(nh)−ϕ0(nl). Additionally, there is
a gain to the economy through the externalities that emanate from a change in δ. This
added to the expression. The above relationship tells us that at the optimum the sum
of all the marginal eﬀects must be zero.
15To go beyond these observations, and determine the precise relationships between eh
and el and between nh and nl, we have to know more about the structure of πj (·).I ti s
clear from (31) that the relative size of eh and el is otherwise indeterminate. Moreover,
with an indeterminate relationship between eh and el, equation (32) shows that the
relationship between nh and nl is also indeterminate. We examine these issues next.
3.3.1 Additive relationship between education and family background
Assume πj = π(e)+θj. It then follows from equation (31) that
eh = el ≡ e. (33)
The intuition behind this result is that eh and el have identical eﬀects on the net
resources of the economy as well as on utilities; hence their values should be the same.
Given that parents do not care about the type of their children, eh and el have no eﬀect
on utilities. As far as costs are concerned, one unit of education has the same resource
cost regardless of who spends it. Finally, when the marginal productivity of education
is independent of the parent’s type, eh and el imply identical externalities as well.
Next, observe that eh = el implies that πh >π l (because θh >θ l). It then follows
from equations (7)—(8) that ∂δ/∂nh > 0 and ∂δ/∂nl < 0. That is, an increase in the
fertility rate of high-ability parents increases δ a n da ni n c r e a s ei nt h ef e r t i l i t yr a t eo f
low-ability parents decreases δ. Recall also that the externality due to δ is positive if
∂δ/∂nj > 0 and negative if ∂δ/∂nj < 0. Consequently, increasing the fertility rate of
high-ability parents entails a positive externality while increasing the fertility rate of
low-ability parents entails a negative externality.




(θl − θh) < 0.
It follows from the strict concavity of ϕ(·) that
nh >n l.
16To see the intuition for this result, observe that with eh = el the only eﬀect of a con-
comitant increase in nh and a reduction in nl on resources comes from the externalities
that emanate from a change in δ. This is equal to (θh − θl)D/Z.A tt h eo p t i m u m ,t h i s
eﬀect must just oﬀset the change in the utilities, ϕ0(nh)−ϕ0(nl). That is, the two eﬀects
must sum to zero. Given that the externality eﬀect is positive, ϕ0(nh)−ϕ0(nl) must be
negative.
We have:
Proposition 3 Assume the relationship between education and family background is
additive. Then under the utilitarian ﬁrst-best solution with PAYGO,
(i) Both types of parents invest equally in education.
(ii) High-ability parents have more children.
(iii) Increasing the fertility rate of high-ability parents increases the proportion of
high-ability children in the economy and thus bestows a positive externality on everybody
else.
(iv) Increasing the fertility rate of low-ability parents, reduces the proportion of high-
ability children and imposes a negative externality on everybody else.
3.3.2 Multiplicative relationship between education and family background







This equation implies π0(eh) <π 0(el). Hence, given the concavity of π(·),
eh >e l.
The diﬀerence between this case and the previous case is the positive eﬀect of a parent
type on the marginal productivity of education. It is precisely because of this reason
that one now requires eh to exceed el.
17Now with eh >e l and θh >θ l, we will again have πh >π l. Consequently, as in
the previous additive case, equations (7)—(8) imply that ∂δ/∂nh > 0 and ∂δ/∂nl < 0.
That is, an increase in the fertility rate of high-ability parents increases δ and entails a
positive externality. On the other hand, an increase in the fertility rate of low-ability
parents decreases δ and entails a negative externality.
Turning to the comparison between nh and nl, we now have from equation (32) that
ϕ0(nh) − ϕ0(nl)=( eh − el)u0(c)+
D
Z
[θlπ (el) − θhπ (eh)].
Now eh −el > 0 implies that π (eh) >π(el). With θh >θ l, then θlπ(el)−θhπ(eh) < 0.
Thus the ﬁrst expression on the right-hand side of the above equation is positive and the
second expression is negative. This implies that one no longer knows if nh is larger or nl.
This result may at ﬁrst appear counter-intuitive given the positive externality associated
with the fertility of high-ability parents and the negative externality associated with the
fertility of low-ability parents. The intuition comes from the observation that eh−el > 0.
This term did not exist in the previous case with eh = el. Its presence means that
increasing the fertility rate of high-ability parents entails extra resource costs to the
society as compared to increasing the fertility rate of low-ability parents.
We have:
Proposition 4 Assume the relationship between education and family background is
multiplicative. Then under the utilitarian ﬁrst-best solution with PAYGO,
(i) High-ability parents invest more in their children.
(ii) Either type can have more children.
(iii) Increasing the fertility rate of high-ability parents increases the proportion of
high-ability children in the economy and thus bestow a positive externality on everybody
else.
(iv) Increasing the fertility rate of low-ability parents, reduces the proportion of high-
ability children and imposes a negative externality on everybody else.
183.4 Decentralization
As observed earlier, the choice of storage technology or PAYGO is mutually exclusive
in our setup. Thus, assuming that PAYGO is preferable, one wants to ensure that all
second-period consumptions are ﬁnanced through pensions. This requires the govern-
ment to impose a one-hundred percent tax on savings and their returns. Recall also
that the optimum required equal consumption levels both during working years and
retirement. Consequently, the government must provide everyone with the same pen-
sion P = dh = dh = d where d is evaluated at its ﬁrst-best value. Next, to induce the
correct choice of fertility and education, two types of subsidies are required. One is a
subsidy on education at the rate τj for the j-type, the other is a direct child subsidy
to the j-type equal to tj dollars per child. Finally, ﬁrst-period lump-sum taxes, Tj, are
required to ensure that consumption levels during working years are the same for both
types. Below, we show how these instruments decentralize the ﬁrst-best allocations.
Give these instruments, parents decide only on their ﬁrst-period consumption and
fertility rate. Let αj denote the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget con-




βjI − cj − nj(a − tj) − (1 − τj)ejnj − Tj
¤
.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are
∂Lj
∂cj
= u0(cj) − αj =0 , (34)
∂Lj
∂ej
= −αj(1 − τj)nj =0 , (35)
∂Lj
∂nj
= ϕ0(nj) − αj [a − tj +( 1− τj)ej]=0 . (36)
The question one needs to examine is how to set the tax rates such that the solution
to the individual’s ﬁrst-order conditions (34)—(36) above coincide with the ﬁrst-best
solution (c,ej,n h,n l) from equations (17)—(25).
19First, compare equation (35), using (34), with (22) and (23). This tells us that

















where c i ss e ta ti t sﬁrst-best value. To understand the intuition behind equations (37)—
(38), note that the algebraic expressions in these equations are precisely the externality
t e r m st h a tc o m ei n t op l a yt h r o u g hδ as eh and el change. The equations then tell us that
at the optimum the subsidy rates on educationm u s te q u a t et h e i rm a r g i n a le x t e r n a l i t y
beneﬁts. Moreover, they also tell us that at the optimum the values of these externalities
must be unity. This should not be surprising. With education investment generating
no private beneﬁts, its price must be subsidized at one-hundred percent; otherwise, one
never invests in education.
Second, substitute τh = τl =1in equation (36) to rewrite it as
ϕ0(nj) − μ(a − tj)=0 .





















where c and e are set at their ﬁrst-best values.
To understand the intuition behind equations (39)—(40), it will be useful to rewrite
them as




















20by moving ej to the left-hand side and recalling that τej = ej because τ =1 . The
left-hand sides of (41) and (42), th+τheh and tl+τlel, show the net subsidy given to an
h-type and to an l-type parent for each of his children. The right-hand sides of (41) and
(42) consist of the two externality sources described previously; they both are present
when nh and nl change. These equations thus tell us that, at the optimum, we should
subsidize the cost of having a child by an amount equal to its net externality beneﬁt.
Recall that the cost of raising and educating a child is a + ej. A child subsidy of t
dollars per child reduces this cost. Similarly, a subsidy to education reduces this cost
but through lowering the price of one particular element of it, namely, education cost.
Thus a subsidy to education is also a subsidy to children. The diﬀerence is that the
education subsidy lowers the share of education cost in total cost. On the other hand,
a subsidy to children is “neutral” between the two sources of costs.
With ∂δ/∂nh > 0, equation (41) tells us that th +τheh > 0, so that the net subsidy
given to an h-type parent for each of his children must be positive. On the other
hand, with ∂δ/∂nl < 0, one cannot a priori determine the sign of the expression on the
right-hand side of (42). Consequently, the sign of tl + τlel remains indeterminate.
Equations (39)—(40) do not allow us to determine the signs of th and tl. However,
if we subtract equation (40) from equation (39), while substituting the expressions for
∂δ/∂nh and ∂δ/∂nl from (7)—(8) in them, we get






so that th >t l. T h i sm a k e ss e n s e . R e c a l lt h a tw eh a v ea tt h eo p t i m u m∂δ/∂nh >
0,∂δ/∂n l < 0. Increasing nh has positive externalities and increasing nl has negative
externalities emanating from δ. The net marginal beneﬁts associated with increasing
nh thus exceeds the net marginal beneﬁts associated with increasing nl. Because of this,
the net subsidy on nh must exceed the net subsidy on nl.
Finally, to ensure that the two types will have identical consumption levels during
working years, one has to set ﬁrst-period lump-sum taxes such that both individual
21t y p e ss p e n dt h es a m ea m o u n to fm o n e yo nc. Comparing equation (34) with (17), while
setting τh = τl =1 , then tells that Th and Tl must satisfy the following condition
Th − Tl =( β − 1)I + nl(a − tl) − nh(a − th), (43)
where th and tl are set according to equations (39)—(40).
To sum, we have shown that ﬁrst-best education subsidies must be levied at one
hundred percent and that higher ability parents should receive higher child subsidies.
However, we have not been able to determine the signs of th and tl. That is, we have
not been able to rule out child taxes (as opposed to child subsidies). Nor have we been
able to determine the sign of the net subsidy for the children of the low-ability parents,
tl +τlel. Although, we have established that th +τheh > 0. To throw some light on this
issue, we resort to a numerical example. With th >t l and tl + τlel >t l, the strongest
candidate is of course tl.
3.5 A numerical example
Assume (i) the preferences are logarithmic and represented by
u =l nc + blnd +l nn,
where b is a positive constant, (ii) the probability of having a high-ability child is related





and (iii) the relationship between π (e) and θj is additives with θl =0and θh =0 .05.
Set β =8 .5, and I =1 0 . Then solve this problem for the utilitarian ﬁr s tb e s tf o l l o w i n g
the steps taken in the paper. The following solutions emerge when parameter b takes
the indicated values below.
22(i) b =1 .1:
nh =8 .04; nl =5 .65; n =6 .81; δ =0 .48; c =1 1 .04; d =8 2 .69;
e =1 .40; th + τheh =2 .03; tl + τlel =1 .45; th =0 .63; tl =0 .05.
(ii) b =1 :
nh =7 .98; nl =5 .70; n =6 .81; δ =0 .48; c =1 1 .59; d =7 8 .88;
e =1 .40; th + τheh =1 .95; tl + τlel =1 .37; th =0 .55; tl = −0.03.
(iii) b =0 .10:
nh =7 .44; nl =6 .16; n =6 .78; δ =0 .48; c =2 0 .95; d =1 4 .77;
e =1 .41; th + τheh =0 .59; tl + τlel =0 .01; th = −0.82; tl = −1.40.
(iv) b =0 .09:
nh =7 .43; nl =6 .17; n =6 .78; δ =0 .48; c =2 1 .14; d =1 3 .47;
e =1 .41; th + τheh =0 .57; tl + τlel = −0.02; th = −0.85; tl = −1.43.
Thus as b, the weight of retirement consumption in the utility function, decreases, d
decreases and with it the intergenerational transfer eﬀect. This reduces the size of the
positive externality of the ﬁrst type. As a result, we see that ﬁrst tl, then th, and ﬁnally
tl + τlel, net subsidy for children of the low-ability type, turn into a tax.
The following proposition summarizes our results on decentralization.
Proposition 5 (i) Investments in education of high- and low-ability parents must be
subsidized at one hundred percent and set equal to the externalities they bestow to every-
one as given by expressions (37)—(38).
(ii) Let tj denote the direct child subsidy to a j-type parent in dollars. Its value must
be set according to (39)—(40). We have th >t l and both th and tl can take positive as
well as negative values.
23(iii) Direct child subsidies and education subsidies both reduce the cost of raising
children. Thus a subsidy to education is also a subsidy to fertility. The diﬀerence is
that the education subsidy lowers the share of education cost in the fertility subsidy. On
the other hand, a subsidy to children is “neutral” between the two sources of costs.
(iv) Denote the subsidy rate on education investment for the j-type by τj. Net subsi-
dies to children are then equal to tj+τjej. They must be set equal to the net externalities
associated with increasing nj as shown by expressions (41) and (42). While th + τheh
is always positive, tl + τlel can take positive as well as negative values.
4 Limited instruments
This section studies the properties of optimal child subsidies versus optimal education
subsidies. The underlying assumption is that either one or the other instrument is used
so that we have a second-best solution.
4.1 Education subsidy
Without child subsidies, one cannot directly control the number of children. However,










With ∂δ/∂eh > 0 and ∂δ/∂el > 0, we continue to have D>0. Again, substituting
the expressions for ∂δ/∂eh and ∂δ/∂el into the above equations and subtracting one








24Consequently, as with the case with both instruments,
eh = el if πj = π(e)+θj,
eh >e l if πj = θjπ (e).


















Finally, turning to the choice of nj, with no child subsidies, individuals set the marginal
rate of substitution between nj and cj equal to the cost of raising a child: ϕ0(nj)/u0(cj)=
a as in equation (12). Now since the solution requires ch = cl, it follows that nh = nl.
4.2 Child subsidy
Without education subsidies, and with parents not beneﬁting directly from educating
their children, nobody invests in education so that eh = el =0 . In this case, equations

























Subtracting one of the above equations from the other one yields
ϕ0(nl) − ϕ0(nh)=
D(πh (0) − πl (0))
Z
.
With π (0) > 0,π h (0) − πl (0) will be positive whether the relationship between π (e)
and θj is additive or multiplicative. Moreover, for education to be of value to the
society, the values of ∂£/∂eh and ∂£/∂el must be positive at eh = el =0 . It follows
25from the expressions for ∂£/∂eh and ∂£/∂el, shown in equations (22)—(23) that D>0.
Consequently, ϕ0(nl) − ϕ0(nh) > 0 and
nh >n l.
Turning to decentralization, equation (36) continues to apply. Given eh = el =0 ,
this equation implies




which is the equation we had for decentralization of the ﬁrst-best.14 Equations (39)—(40)


















th − tl =
D
u0(c)
πh (0) − πl (0)
Z
> 0.
Observe that in this case, child subsidies and net subsidies to children are one and the
same.
4.3 Education or child subsidy
The question we would like to address is which instrument should be used if one can use
only one of the two. To answer this question, one has to compare the optimal solution
when using the education subsidy with the optimal solution when using the child subsidy.
There does not seem to be a general answer to this question. One expects that education
subsidies will be the better policy whenever productivity diﬀerential between high- and
low-ability individuals is high, and whenever one’s family background plays a minor role
14Here ej =0implies that (1 − τj)ej =0 ;at the ﬁrst best, it was τj =1which implied (1 − τj)ej =0 .
26in determining the ability of a child. To shed some light on this issue, we again resort
to a numerical question.
We use the same logarithmic speciﬁcation for preferences as before with the coeﬃ-
cient of lnd being set equal to one, the same additive speciﬁcation for πj (e), and the
same functional form for π (e). We also set θl =0and I =1 0 . The parameter values
that we allow to change are those for θh and β. Below are three sets of solutions.
(i) θh =0 .05,β=5 :
Education subsidy: n =2 .57; δ =0 .53; e =2 .05; δuh +( 1− δ)uh =6 .57.
Child subsidy: n =5 .18; δ =0 .27; e =0 .00; δuh +( 1− δ)uh =6 .56.
(ii) θh =0 .05,β=4 :
Education subsidy : n =2 .25; δ =0 .51; e =1 .75; δuh +( 1− δ)uh =5 .88.
Child subsidy : n =4 .51; δ =0 .27; e =0 .00; δuh +( 1− δ)uh =6 .01.
(iii) θh =0 .10,β=5 :
Education subsidy : n =2 .64; δ =0 .56; e =2 .10; δuh +( 1− δ)uh =6 .71.
Child subsidy : n =5 .50; δ =0 .30; e =0 .00; δuh +( 1− δ)uh =6 .74.
Case (i) illustrates a solution where an education subsidy dominates a child subsidy.
In case (ii) we lower the value of β, leaving all other parameter values intact, and
the child subsidy dominates. A lower β represents a smaller productivity diﬀerential
between high- and low-ability individuals. Similarly, in case (iii) we increase the value
of θh, leaving all other parameter values intact, and the child subsidy dominates. A
higher θh represents a more signiﬁcant role for family background in determining the
ability of a child. Rather unsurprisingly, the numbers also indicate that child subsidies
generally entail higher fertility and a lower ratio of high- to low-ability children. The
following proposition summarizes our results on decentralization.
27Proposition 6 (i) Assume education subsidies are feasible but not child subsidies. The
optimal solution requires equalization of all objects of choice across the two types. ed-
ucation subsidies continue to be levied at one hundred percent and equal to the positive
externalities bestowed on everyone through education.
(ii) Assume child subsidies are feasible but not education subsidies. The optimal
solution requires ch = cl,d h = dl,e h = el =0 , and nh >n l. Child subsidies are set
equal to fertility externalities and equal to net subsidies on children.
(iii) Either education subsidies or child subsidies can dominate the other instrument.
In general, child subsidies become the more dominant policy if productivity diﬀerential
between high- and low-ability individuals become smaller or family background assumes
am o r es i g n i ﬁcant role in determining the ability of a child.
(iv) In general, child subsidies entail a higher fertility rate and a lower ratio of high-
to low-ability children, as compared to education subsidies.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In discussing PAYGO pension plans, models with endogenous fertility have emphasized
the positive externality that each person’s fertility decision bestows on everybody by
increasing everybody’s pension beneﬁts through a higher population growth rate. This
type of externality, has been argued, may be internalized through child subsidies. Sim-
ilarly, models with endogenous human capital formation have emphasized the positive
externality of investing in education of one’s children (because parents cannot expro-
priate the children’s extra earnings due to parents’ education expenditures). The same
argument has been put forward in cases when parents build their own human capital
which they subsequently pass on to their children. These types of externalities may be
internalized through education subsidies.
In this paper, we have combined the diﬀerent externality sources to learn what
their interactions teach us about the combination of child and education subsidies one
28must use to internalize them both. We have also been concerned with the question of
heterogeneity of parents and how this may come into play in connection with externality-
correcting policies. This is particularly relevant when child and education subsidies
change the distribution of parent types. To this end, the paper has modeled endogenous
f e r t i l i t ya n dh u m a nc a p i t a lf o r m a t i o ni na no verlapping-generations framework wherein
every generation consists of high earners and low earners with the proportion of types
being determined endogenously. We have found, among other results, that:
(1) Investing in education of children by either type of parents increases the pro-
portion of high-ability children in the economy and bestows a positive externality on
everybody else. This externality has two components, one of which exists only in the
presence of PAYGO pension plans.
(2) When high-ability parents increase their fertility rate, they increase the propor-
tion of high-ability children in the economy and thus bestow a positive externality on
everybody else. On the other hand, an increase in the fertility rate of low-ability par-
ents, reduces the proportion of high-ability children and imposes a negative externality
on everybody else.
(3) Direct child subsidies and education subsidies both reduce the cost of raising
children. Thus a subsidy to education is also a subsidy to fertility. The diﬀerence is
that the education subsidy lowers the share of education cost in the fertility subsidy.
On the other hand, a subsidy to children is “neutral” between the two sources of costs.
(4) Investments in education of high- and low-ability parents must always be subsi-
dized because they entail positive externalities.
(5) Direct child subsidies to one or both parent types can be negative; i.e., they can
be taxes. However the high-ability type should always get a higher subsidy per child
(or pay a lower tax).
(6) Net subsidies to children of a particular parent type (direct child subsidies plus
education subsidies) must be set equal to the net externalities associated with increasing
29the fertility rate of that type. While net child subsidies to high-ability parents are always
positive, net child subsidies to low-ability parents can be positive or negative.
(7) Either education subsidies or child subsidies, when used alone, can dominate
the other instrument. In general, child subsidies become the more dominant policy if
productivity diﬀerential between high- and low-ability individuals become smaller or
family background assumes a more signiﬁcant role in determining the ability of a child.
(8) In general, using child subsidy instruments alone entails a higher fertility rate and
a lower ratio of high- to low-ability children, as compared to using education subsidies
alone.
As a ﬁnal observation, we remind our readers that our study has been conducted
primarily in a ﬁrst-best environment. Many other interesting issues surface in a second-
best environment when investments and/or type are not publicly observable. We have
left the examination of these other issues to a subsequent paper.
30Appendix A
Proof of 2δ(nh − nl)+nl(1 + πl) − nhπh > 0: Rewrite equation(1) as
δT+1 =
δTnhπh +( 1− δT)nlπl
δTnh +( 1− δT)nl
≡ f (δT,n h,πh,n l,πl). (A1)
The steady-state value of δ is found from
½
δT+1 = f (δT,n h,πh,n l,πl),
δT+1 = δT = δ.
(A2)














































Comparing the expressions for dδ/deh as given by equation (A6) above and equation
(7) derived in the text tells us that the denominator in equations (7)—(8) is equal to the
denominator of (A6). That is,
Z ≡ 2δ(nh − nl)+nl(1 + πl) − nhπh = n[1 − ∂f/∂δT].
Now if ∂f/∂δT < 0, then 1−∂f/∂δT > 0 ⇒ Z>0. On the other hand, if ∂f/∂δT > 0,
the stability condition |∂δT+1/∂δT| = |∂f/∂δT| < 1 implies that 1 − ∂f/∂δT > 0 and
we again have Z>0.
31Appendix B: Storage
When the use of storage technology is the better option, all second-period consump-
tion is ﬁnanced by private savings. We thus have
[δSh +( 1− δ)Sl](1+r)=δdh +( 1− δ)dl.
This simpliﬁes the resource constraint (15) to
[1 + (β − 1)δ)]I = δ
∙












The social planner’s problem is thus summarized by the Lagrangian
£ = δ [u(ch)+v(dh)+ϕ(nh)] + (1 − δ)[u(cl)+v(dl)+ϕ(nl)] + μ
(
[1 + (β − 1)δ)]I
−δ
∙




− (1 − δ)
∙





Observe that the diﬀerence of this expression with £ under PAYGO is that dj/(1 + r)
has replaced dj/n.
Start with the ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem with respect ch,c l,d h and dl.
They are identical to their counterparts under PAYGO except for (1 + r) replacing n.





= ϕ(nh) − ϕ(nl)+u0(c)[(β − 1)I − nh (a + eh)+nl (a + el)], (B3)
and note that, unlike D under PAYGO given by equation (21), this expression does
not contain the term u0(c)(nh − nl)d/n2; the other terms are identical. The ﬁrst-order
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Note that the expressions in (B4)—(B5) are the same as their counterparts under PAYGO,
equations (22)—(23), except for the diﬀerence in D. Equations (B6)—(B7) diﬀer with their
PAYGO counterparts (24)—(25) not only in terms of D, but they do not contain d/n2
in their middle expression either. Manipulating these conditions in the same way as we
d i dw i t hP A Y G Oy i e l d :eh = el = e and nh >n l if πj (e)=π (e)+θj; and eh >e l with
an indeterminate relationship between nh and nl if πj (e)=θjπ(e).




























for increasing nl. (B11)
They all arise from a change in δ; there are no externalities associated with a change in
n whether directly as in intergenerational transfer eﬀect or indirectly through δ. That
there is no indirect externality through interaction of n and δ also means that the extent
of this externality depends on the type of pension plan in use. Observe that if δ remains
unchanged, we have only the usual private calculations of utility and cost changes; there
will be no externality. It is thus the externality associated with the change in δ that
33distinguishes the storage story here as compared to Cremer et al. (2006, 2008) where
the laissez faire solution under the storage technology was optimal.
Regarding decentralization, we will again have 100% education subsidies with τh and
τl also being equal to their corresponding externality terms (B8)—(B9). Net subsidies
to children, th + τhe and tl + τle are set equal to the externality terms associated with
nh and nl as given by (B10)—(B11). With D>0, from (B4) or (B5), and ∂δ/∂nh > 0
and ∂δ/∂nl < 0, we now have
th + τhe>0 and tl + τle<0.
Given τh = τl, this also means that the sign of th is indeterminate but that tl < 0.
Finally, we continue to have th >t l.
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